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WASHINGTON CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT-
ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS AND POLICIES
JOHN J. O'CONNELL*
With the enactment of the Washington Consumer Protection Act,1
the Washington attorney will be meeting for the first time a compre-
hensive "antitrust" act designed to operate on the local or "intra-state"
level.2 Because this act is, for the most part, unprecedented in this
state,' and because it involves, in addition to most of the complexities
of federal antitrust-law, a few novel features of its own, some sort of
introduction to its provisions might be helpful to members of the Wash-
ington bar. There appears elsewhere in this issue an examination of
the substantive provisions of this new law; my observations will be
narrower in scope, and will deal mainly with the enforcement provisions.
More particularly, I wish to outline the legal "tools" which can be
used to enforce the act, some of the policy decisions which were made
in fashioning these tools, and the policies-or, perhaps less pretenti-
ously and more accurately-the attitudes, which are likely to guide
my administration of this act and my use of these tools. Any attempt
* Attorney General for the State of Washington. This article was prepared by staff
members of the Office of the Attorney General, under the direction of Mr. John J.
O'Connell, Attorney General, and Mr. Gerald F. Collier, Assistant Attorney General
and Chief of the Antitrust and Consumer Protection Division.
I Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 216.
2 This act may be considered as simply compliance by the legislature with the man-
date given to it by the Washington Constitution, article XII, § 22. "MONOPOLIES
AND TRUSTS. Monopolies and trusts shall never be allowed in this state, and no
incorporated company, co-partnership, or association of persons in this state shall
directly or indirectly combine or make any contract with any other incorporated com-
pany, foreign or domestic, through their stockholders, or the trustees or assignees of
such stockholders, or with any co-partnership or association of persons, or in any
manner whatever for the purpose of fixing the price or limiting the production or regu-
lating the transportation of any product or commodity. The legislature shall pass laws
for the enforcement of this section by adequate penalties, and in case of incorporated
companies, if necessary for that purpose, may declare a forfeiture of their franchises."
"It cannot be said that the makers of the constitution understood § 22, above quoted,
to be self-executing, since they expressly provided that the legislature shall pass laws
for its enforcement." Northwestern Warehouse Co. v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 32
Wash. 218, 227, 73 Pac. 388, 391 (1903). This provision, adopted before the enactment
of any of the present federal antitrust legislation, is "simply a recognition of the com-
mon law on the subject reduced to definite terms and made the fundamental law of the
state." American Export Door Corp. v. Gauger, 154 Wash. 514, 519, 283 Pac. 462, 465
(1929). A violation of its provisions will support an action for damages or a suit for
an injunction by the party injured. Group Health Co-op. v. King County Medical
Soc'y, 39 Wn2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951). But this would seem to be the only sense
in which this provision could be deemed "self-executing."
8 There are a number of previously adopted provisions generally implementing art.
XII, § 22. Prior to the adoption of Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 216, however, no legis-
lative attempt to provide a comprehensive statute dealing with the problem appears to
have been made. See RCW 9.22.010; RCW 19.90; RCW 24.04.100.
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to promulgate a full-blown enforcement policy in advance of its im-
mediate application would be, of course, not only hazardous but prob-
ably impossible.
To put the enforcement provisions of this act into proper perspective,
a quick glance should be made at the substantive provisions, for the
enforcement devices available will depend upon the particular sub-
stantive provision which is being violated.
There are roughly three categories of conduct which the act covers.
First, section 2 deals with the same types of business activity as are
covered by section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and reads
as follows: "Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby
declared unlawful."
This language is intended to embrace a persistent epidemic of prac-
tices which, under the guise of legitimate commerce, take an unfair
advantage of competitors and consumers alike, and range from the use
of over-zealous selling devices to outright fraud and swindle.'
The wideness of scope and the generality of this language result from
the difficulty of providing any specific standards and definitions which
would cover all such conduct. In drafting the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, Congress saw this problem very clearly:
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices.
There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field. Even if all known
unfair practices were specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at
once necessary to begin over again. If Congress were to adopt the
method of definition, it would undertake an endless task. It is also
practically impossible to define unfair practices so that the definition
will fit business of every sort in every part of this country. Whether
competition is unfair or not generally depends upon the surrounding
circumstances of the particular case. What is harmful under certain
circumstances may be beneficial under different circumstances. 5
The second category comprises principally anticompetitive acts
which are made illegal per se. These include acts which because of
their "pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue"6 are made illegal regardless of their actual impact upon com-petition. This category includes contracts, combinations, and con-
spiracies in restraint of trade, and monopolization or attempts to mo-
4For examples of such activity see CONSUMER ADVISORY CouNcIL, REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR 41-42 (1960). See also RESEARCH INDEX TO FTC COURT CASES (1952).
5 H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914).
6 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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nopolize, and is covered in sections 3 and 4 of the act, modeled after
sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act.7
Sections 5 and 6 deal with a third category, viz., conduct which ex-
perience has indicated, if left to flourish, will eventually result in re-
straint or the elimination of competition. In order to "nip in the bud"
any serious interference with free and open competition, these two sec-
tions prohibit the acquisition of stock of one corporation by another,
and exclusive dealing contracts, if and only if, such acquisitions and
such contracts may result in a restraint of trade or commerce or a sub-
stantial lessening of competition.
Although application of these sections must meet the "rule of reason,"
incorporated in section 20 of the act, both of these sections are applic-
able to conduct which may tend to impair significantly the vigor of
competition. The language is based on sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton
Act.8
Before outlining the specific enforcement devices contained in the
act, attention should be directed to two devices which were deliberately
omitted. Neither criminal procedures, similar to those available to the
U.S. Justice Department in its enforcement of the federal antitrust
laws, nor administrative regulatory authority, similar to that of the
Federal Trade Commission, have been provided.
The omission of criminal procedures is in accord with my view of the
proper role of such legislation. While they do serve the purpose of
discouraging blatant violations, criminal prosecutions are often too
slow, cumbersome, or unpopular to regulate effectively business con-
duct. This has been demonstrated in this state as well as in others.
The purpose of any such controls should be basically to foster public
protection rather than to punish for violations;. Where, as in the case
of outright swindles for example, public protection dictates the neces-
sity of punishment, the prosecuting attorneys will continue to bring
criminal proceedings.
There has been created no state counterpart of the Federal Trade
Commission, with all of its regulatory powers. The Washington Con-
sumer Advisory Council, which drafted the basic language of the act,
recommended that whatever controls are necessary should be ad-
ministered within the framework of an existing state agency. This was
726 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1958).8 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958) ; 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1958).
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based simply on the desire to avoid the creation of an additional public
agency, with its additional expense to the public.9
The following is a summary of the act's enforcement tools:
1. Civil Investigative Demand. This device, made available by sec-
tion 11, authorizes the attorney general to compel the production of
documentary material during the pre-complaint stage of antitrust in-
vestigation. Several states have similar investigatory provisions.
It should be noted that authority to resort to investigatory demands
is limited to possible violations of only those sections of the act dealing
with conspiracy to restrain trade, monopolization, exclusive dealing,
and corporate acquisition (sections 3, 4, 5 and 6).
2. Injunction. Section 8 enables the state to obtain an injunction
from the superior courts to restrain violations of any of the substantive
provisions of the act.
3. Assurance of Discontinuance. Section 10 provides that the at-
torney general may accept written agreements to discontinue practices
which are deemed to be in violation of any of the substantive provisions
of the act. Such agreements must be filed with and are subject to the
supervision of the superior courts.
4. Civil Penalty. Section 14 imposes a civil penalty of not more than
twenty-five thousand dollars for a violation of section 3 or section 4 of
the act. Violations of other substantive provisions of the act are not
subject to the penalty unless there is a violation of an injunction issued
to restrain conduct in violation of any such provision.
5. Corporate Dissolution. Section 15 provides that, upon petition
by the attorney general, an order of dissolution or forfeiture of fran-
chise may be entered against any corporation in violation of sections 3
and 4, or the terms of any injunction issued pursuant to the act.
I would like to review briefly some of the considerations which went
into the forging of these enforcement tools, and some of my attitudes
toward their utilization.
The investigatory demand authorized by section 11, because of its
breadth, must be employed with a great amount of discretion. Viola-
tions for which it may be employed do not include conduct prohibited
by section 2, since the wide scope of this section might well provide
too many occasions for unwarranted "fishing expeditions."
Despite the potential danger in such a summary procedure for in-
9 CONSUMER ADVISORY COUNCI, RErORT TO THE GOVERNOR 3 (1960).
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vestigation, the adoption of this provision seems to me to have been
wise, and may be of value not only to the investigator, but to the in-
vestigated as well. As the Attorney General's Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws has stated:
The inevitable generality of most statutory antitrust prohibitions ren-
ders facts of paramount importance. Accordingly, effective enforce-
ment requires full and comprehensive investigation before formal pro-
ceedings, civil or criminal, are commenced. Incomplete investigation
may mean proceedings not justified by more careful search and study
10
Whether a complaint should be filed often can be determined only after
careful analysis of company books or records. Understandably enough,
the company is likely to be a bit uncooperative when it is asked to
hand such records over voluntarily, yet the filing of skeleton com-
plaints, simply to obtain compulsory discovery techniques, seems highly
undesirable. As the Judicial Conference of the United States has put it,
no plaintiff should "pretend to bring charges in order to discover
whether charges should be brought." 1t
Moreover, section 11 contains a number of safeguards against pos-
sible abuse. Thus, subsection 3 provides in general that any material
not properly obtainable by a subpoena duces tecum is not obtainable
through the investigatory demand. Subsection 6 controls the disclosure
of material to parties other than the court itself or authorized em-
ployees of the attorney general, and requires court approval before
presentation to the court of material containing trade secrets. And sub-
section 7 authorizes petitions in superior court for extensions of the
return date of the demand, and for the modification or setting aside of
the demand.
The use of the injunction, it is hoped, will provide a relatively swift
and inexpensive method of formal enforcement. However, the proce-
dure should be pursued, in most cases, only after adequate steps have
been taken and failed to effect an assurance of discontinuance. There
will of course be situations where an abuse is immediately detrimental
to the consuming public and in which the swiftest possible action is
desirable. Yet even in these cases, especially in other than section 2
violations, temporary injunctions, while they might seem useful, should
be requested with considerable reluctance.
1o ATT'Y. GEN. NAT'L Commr. ANTITRUST RP. 343 (1955).
11 JUDICAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT ON PROCEDURE IN ANTTRmUST AND
oraER PRoTRAcE CASES, 13 F.R.D. 41, 67 (1951), quoted in ATTY. GEN. NAT'L Comm.
ANTruST REP. 345 (1955).
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The language of the provision authorizing assurances of discontinu-
ance was suggested as a substitute for the consent decree available to
the Justice Department, since the former device is more flexible and
less formal.
The section authorizing forfeiture of a corporate franchise permits
the courts, in their discretion, to order an ouster or charter forfeiture
in case of corporate violators. This device has express constitutional
authorization and its use is not unprecedented in this state.' It is most
effective in the case of foreign corporations which may not be suffi-
ciently vulnerable to other enforcement devices.
Since such an order may amount to corporate capital punishment, it
should be requested and granted only in the most flagrant cases, where
other enforcement devices have failed.
Finally, a few remarks about the general role of this act as I conceive
it. First, the underlying purpose of this legislation is to complement
the body of federal law governing restraints of trade and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce. While the breadth of federal
jurisdiction under the commerce clause has seemingly become almost
boundless, the states have not lost their responsibility in this areaY
And since the United States Department of Justice gives priority in
assigning its manpower to practices affecting the national economy
rather than to those with primarily a local impact,"4 the states abdicate
this responsibility only at their own peril. However, because of limited
financial resources and manpower, it will be necessary on the state
level to use a system of priorities similar to those used by the Justice
Department, by dealing only with those problems which pose the most
imminent and serious threat to the state's business and consumer
climate.
Second, freedom rather than restraint should always be the rule;
freedom from excessive business regulation as well as freedom from
12 See RCW 9.22.030 quoted note 2 supra, and State ex rel. Hamilton v. Standard
Oil Co., 176 Wash. 231, 28 P.2d 790 (1934). See also, RCW 7.56.010.
is The legislative history of the Sherman Act supports this conclusion. Senator
Sherman made clear that the states were not to be ousted from their traditional juris-
diction in this area: "This bill ... has for its ... object to invoke the aid of the courts
of the United States to deal with the combinations ... when they affect injuriously
our foreign and interstate commerce... and in this way to supplement the enforcement
of the established rules of the common and statute law by the courts of the several
States in dealing with combinations that affect injuriously the industrial liberty of the
citizens of these States. It is to arm the Federal courts within the limits of their con-
stitutional power that they may cooperate with the State courts in checking, curbing,
and controlling the most dangerous combinations that now threaten the business, prop-
erty, and trade of the people of the United States .... 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890).
14 See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, STATE ANTITRUST LAW REFERENCE HANDBOOK 2
(1960).
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anti-competitive restrictions. If regulation of business to any degree is
required, it should be limited to the absolute minimum essential to
maintaining a fair bargaining position for the consumer, with the least
possible interference with freedom of commercial enterprise because
business and industry in this state and in the nation are fundamentally
legitimate and honest.
Thus, business regulation should be designed to assist industry in
policing itself, and governmentally enforced controls should be asserted
only in those dark corners of the business community where self-
regulation is ineffective.
Third, there is a real need for a framework within which the adjust-
ment of abuses may be accomplished informally. My feeling is that the
use of such "pre-legal" procedures will facilitate and stimulate the
achievement by business of self-regulation and avoid, to some extent,
the necessity of expensive and time-consuming litigation in each indi-
vidual case that arises.
Such a program as I have in mind for effecting this approach to the
administration of the act embraces several general efforts:
1) A constant effort at public education, to the end that consumers
may be generally equipped to better protect themselves from unde-
sirable business practices. Such an approach, if effective at all, neces-
sarily must be, to a great degree, restricted in its application to section
2 violations. Consumer action can do little to alter the course of the
market conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Act provisions.
2) Attempts to assist business and industry in the establishment of
an effective atmosphere of self-regulation.
3) Employment of the less formal "assurance of discontinuance"
wherever possible not only to prevent further abuses with regard to
substantive provisions of the act, but also to provide some working
guides to the specific kinds of conduct considered to be in violation.
4) Vigorous formal enforcement of the act where flagrant or re-
peated abuses occur, especially with respect to public bidding and pur-
chasing, and section 2 violations.
One device which has no formal sanction in the act, the trade con-
ference, has been fruitfully utilized by the Federal Trade Commission
and can, I believe, be fostered on the local level with even more re-
warding results. Industry-wide attempts, within state confines, to
reach commonly acceptable definitions of fair conduct are likely to
1961]
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arouse more public awareness and business responsibility precisely
because they are closer to the "grass roots." It is my hope that our
office will be able to sponsor and encourage a number of such confer-
ences as problem areas are uncovered.
Especially where section 2 violations are concerned, an active pro-
gram of informational exchange and enforcement cooperation with
Better Business Bureaus, local law enforcement offices, applicable fed-
eral agencies, and other state attorneys general should go far to stem
the undesirable commercial activities, and secure to consumers the
fruits of our system of free enterprise.
